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When candidates in primary elections are ideologically differentiated (e.g., conservatives and
moderates in the Republican party), then candidates with similar positions affect each others’ vote
shares more strongly than candidates with different ideological positions. We measure this effect in
U.S. Presidential primaries and show that it is of first order importance. We also show that voter
beliefs about the candidates harden over the course of the primary, as manifested in the variability
of candidate vote shares. We discuss models of sequential voting that cannot yield this pattern of
results, and propose an explanation based on a model with horizontally and vertically differentiated
candidates and incompletely informed voters. Consistent with the predictions of this model, we
also show that, in more conservative states, low quality conservative candidates do better relative
to high quality conservatives, and vice versa.
JEL Classification Numbers: D72, D60.
Keywords: Voting, primary elections, simultaneous versus sequential elections.
1 Introduction
Candidates for the U.S. presidential election are determined through a sequence of elections within each
political party, the primaries, which are managed by the two major parties in collaboration with the
states. We address one key feature of these primaries: At the beginning of the process, there are often
more than just two candidates who compete with each other, and this situation generates coordination
problems for voters and candidates that may result in the nomination of an inferior candidate, either
quality-wise or in the sense that the nominee does not represent the majority-preferred position. We
consider a situation in which candidates differ both “horizontally” (i.e., with respect to their policy
positions) and “vertically” (i.e., with respect to their quality, often called “valence”). For example,
Republican primary candidates may be either “moderates” or “conservatives”, and each voter has a
preference for one of these positions, which, however, is not absolute: If a voter considers a candidate
in the other position to have a sufficiently higher valence, he would vote for that candidate rather than
an ideologically closer competitor.
A problem for voters is that they only receive imperfect and idiosyncratic signals about the
candidates’ valences so that candidates with the same policy position may split the votes of voters
with a preference for their common position. For example, in the 2008 Republican primary, Mitt
Romney felt that Mike Huckabee’s presence in the competition made it impossible for him to unite
the conservative wing of the Republican party behind him against John McCain. Romney first publicly
called on Huckabee to drop out of the race, and, when this appeal was unsuccessful, withdrew himself.
This vote-splitting effect presents a substantial problem for the efficiency of any voting system,
and not just for primaries. When more than two candidates run in an election, a weaker candidate
might win in a situation where the Condorcet winner is splitting votes with a close ideological neighbor.
The sequential presidential primary system provides a unique opportunity to gauge the presence and
size of this vote-splitting effect, because some candidates drop out during the primaries, and those
voters who would have voted for the drop-out choose which of the remaining candidates to support.
Also, learning about candidate quality is just as important in simultaneous elections as in sequential
ones, yet with all votes cast simultaneously, it is hard to disentangle the voters’ policy preferences
about candidates and their beliefs about candidate valences. By studying sequential primaries, we
improve on our understanding of learning and inference in all elections.
We measure the extent to which candidate competition is stronger among those who occupy the
same political position, compared to competition across political positions. Our analysis uses data
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from the six contested U.S. Presidential primaries that took place between 2000 and 2012,1 and relies
on the observation that, for those years, a dichotomous partition of (serious) candidates in a set
of “conservatives” and “moderates” for the Republican party, and “establishment” and “outsider”
candidates for the Democratic Party, does well in capturing the most salient cleavages in each party.
The empirical evidence confirms that, if a candidate drops out, this benefits the remaining can-
didates who shared the drop-out’s position more than it benefits candidates in the opposite position.
The effect is quantitatively very large: a candidate will take three times as many votes from compet-
ing candidates of the same position than he/she will from other candidates. This highlights a crucial
problem in multi-candidate primaries: candidates who are ideologically close substitutes largely “steal”
votes from each other, which may ultimately lead to the nomination of the “wrong” candidate.
We then show that electoral variability declines over time. Variability is defined to capture voter
learning over time, facilitated through observation of previous election results. This effect is measured
without making parametric assumptions, by utilizing the fact that many state contests are taking
place on the same date. We show that the variability of vote shares, controlling for other factors
through the use of election round fixed effects, decreases with the number of states that voted before
a particular contest. In other words, if the same set of candidates competes in two groups of states
holding elections in two different dates, the within group vote share variance is higher in the states
that vote first; when the set of candidates in the second group is smaller, we adjust the vote share
variance to make the comparison valid. Thus, as voters learn more about a candidate from coverage
and campaigning in other states, they are less likely to be swayed by further information that emerges.
We discuss models with predictions that are not fully consistent with the observed pattern of
results. We then propose an explanation based on the model in Deltas, Herrera, and Polborn (2016).
In addition to explaining the observed substitutability and volatility patterns, this model also predicts
that an increase of the share of voters who prefer a particular political position leads to a higher
increase in the absolute number of votes for a strong candidate rather than a weak candidate in that
position, but relatively, weak candidates benefit more than strong ones. We show that this prediction
bears out in our data.
Differential competition between candidates is directly relevant to (tactical) coordination between
voters. This, along with learning about candidate quality, have long been known to be important
issues in presidential primaries. For example, Bartels (1987, pp.13) provides a clear description of
the coordination process of those Democratic voters unhappy with the establishment candidate in the
1We exclude George W. Bush’s and Barack Obama’s essentially unopposed renominations in 2004 and 2012.
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1984 Democratic primary.2
Most of the theoretical literature on primaries focuses on a contest between only two candidates,
and therefore does not deal with the problem of vote-splitting between similar candidates that we
focus on most in the present paper (Dekel and Piccione 2000; Klumpp and Polborn 2006; Callander
2007; Schwabe (2015)). These papers focus on voter learning about valence when voters care only
about valence and not about political positions. Our empirical results strongly suggest that ideological
differences between candidates matter substantially — voters view some candidates as closer substi-
tutes than others. This implies that empirical models that ignore position differences may mistake
ideological variation between sequentially voting states for learning about candidate valence.
To our knowledge, the only models of dynamic primaries as contests between more than 2 can-
didates are Knight and Schiff (2010), Knight and Hummel (2015) and Deltas, Herrera, and Polborn
(2016). Knight and Schiff (2010) and Knight and Hummel (2015) develop a model of voter learning
about candidate quality in which voters in later states receive some imperfect information about the
signal that voters in earlier states observed. Voters update, taking all pieces of information into ac-
count, and vote for their preferred candidate given this information. In their estimation based on the
2004 Democratic Presidential Primaries, they find that voters attach a substantial weight on the out-
comes of early elections, but a much smaller weight after the fourth primary. Thus, in their framework,
predicted share volatility declines up to the fifth primary round, but is essentially constant thereafter.
Our empirical strategy is agnostic about whether a voter in a state infers perfectly or noisily the signal
that voters in other states have observed by the voting outcome in that state. However, our results
suggest that much of this signal is directly observed (as in our model) given that share volatility falls
throughout the primary season, and not only after the first few election contests.
Deltas, Herrera, and Polborn (2016) analyze a structural model of learning about candidate
quality in which candidates are also differentiated with respect to their political positions. They
estimate their model using the same data as the present paper, but focus on simulating the effects of
different institutional setups, such as moving to a simultaneous primary system. The analysis in the
current paper focuses on the measurement of the substitution and learning effects; it does not impose
the model in Deltas, Herrera, and Polborn (2016), but shows that the model can explain the empirical
findings.3
2See also Bartels (1985, 1988), and Kenny and Rice (1994) which all focus on two-candidate settings.
3Among theoretical static models of primaries (i.e., those where there is only one vote at the primary stage), our
paper is most related to Adams and Merrill (2008) and Serra (2011) which point out that holding primaries allows a
party to select, on average, higher quality candidates than with a direct nomination of a candidate by party insiders.
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2 Data
Our dataset consists of information from six of the 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 United States Presi-
dential primaries – we exclude the 2004 Republican and the 2012 Democratic primaries because the
incumbent Presidents were effectively unopposed. We focus on candidates who are initially considered
viable candidates in the sense that there is some chance that they will win their party’s nomination.
In practice, some of the candidates do not fall into this category because they are too far away from
their party’s mainstream, and run to represent a particular energized constituency in order to demon-
strate that the party needs to pay attention to its preferences. These candidacies are unlikely to be
well-captured by any theoretical model, and so we exclude them from our data set.
The most successful excluded candidates are Dennis Kucinich (Democratic primary 2004 and
2008) and Ron Paul (Republican primary 2008). Their vote share is usually higher in low-turnout
contests later in the sequence in which their energized base represents a larger fraction of the electorate.
In contrast, unsuccessful but potentially “serious” candidates (for example, Joe Lieberman (D-2004) or
Rudy Giuliani (R-2008)) have their best performances in early primaries, then lose voter support due
to their relatively poor performance, and eventually drop out once it becomes clear that they have no
chance of winning the nomination. Tables A1 and A2 list the candidates we include for each primary,
along with the states in which they competed and the vote share they obtained. The tables also give
the number of different election dates (rounds) up to the election in each state. A key component of
our empirical analysis (also incorporated in the model in Section 4 below) is that candidates of each
party are characterized by one of two political positions, representing the main ideological cleavage
in the party. The classification of candidates into positions, to which we turn next, is listed in the
bottom of Tables A1 and A2.
In the Republican party, the main ideological fault line appears to be between conservatives (i.e.,
candidates and voters who often have a fundamentalist Christian background and emphasize “value-
issues” such as abortion and gay marriage) and moderates. A standard approach to determining a
candidate’s position is the use of NOMINATE scores based on roll-call votes (see Poole and Rosenthal
(1985)). However, such scores are only available for legislators, and the majority of candidates has
an executive background (e.g., former governors). Our classification is therefore guided by common
sense and exit polls that ask voters which candidate they voted for, and whether they personally
identify as conservative, moderate or liberal. We focus on exit polls in early primary or caucus
states, as these are usually the only ones in which all candidates we consider are running and where
each of them receives a sufficiently large vote share. For example, in the 2000 Republican contest,
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George W. Bush did considerably better with voters who identified as conservative rather than with
those who said they were moderate, and vice versa for John McCain.4 For this reason, we classify
Bush as conservative and McCain as moderate. In 2008, we take the MSNBC exit polls (available on
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21660890), since they ask voters to identify as conservative, moderate
or liberal, while CNN has dropped this question in many exit polls). McCain and Giuliani always
do considerably better with voters who identify as moderates, while Huckabee and Thompson do
considerably better with conservatives. Romney generally does better with conservatives than with
moderates, except for states in which the Republican primary electorate is extremely conservative.
For example, in Iowa, 88 percent of Republican primary voters identify as strongly or somewhat
conservative, while only 11 percent identify as moderates. Romney receives about the same vote share
from conservatives and moderates (25 percent versus 26 percent). However, in states like Michigan
or Florida where the percentage of conservatives in around 60, Romney does substantially better
with conservatives than with moderates. Moreover, in the later stages of the campaign, Romney was
perceived to fight with Huckabee over the conservative vote.5 For this reason, we classify Romney
as conservative. In the 2012 primary, however, Romney was the moderate standard-bearer, facing
Gingrich and Santorum who were supported by conservatives. Their splitting of the conservative vote
helped him win the nomination. For that year, Romney is classified as a moderate.
It would be tempting to attempt a formally analogous classification of Democratic candidates as
“liberal” or “moderate”. However, for Democrats, the ideological position of the voter appears to have
much less predictive power. For example, in Nevada, self-declared liberals voted 48/39/9 for Clinton,
Obama and Edwards, while moderates voted 46/43/8 for these candidates. This difference between
liberals and moderates is well within the margin of error. A considerably better sorting is achieved by a
question that asks voters which candidate qualities matter most: “Has the necessary experience,” “Can
achieve the necessary change,” “Cares about people like me” or “Can win in November.” Leaving out
the last category (since this is mostly concerned with the horserace aspect of politics, rather than policy
preferences), we would argue that people who consider “experience” most important have a preference
for Washington insiders, while those who appreciate “change” or “caring” candidates prefer outsiders.
On the basis of this question in the MSNBC exit polls in early states, we classify Clinton as insider
and Edwards and Obama as outsiders in 2008. In 2004, Kerry receives the largest share from voters
4See, e.g., http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/primaries/NH/poll.rep.html,
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/primaries/SC/poll.rep.html,
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/primaries/IA/poll.html. In the 2000 Republican primary, we also identify Steve
Forbes and Alan Keyes as conservatives, as they also do better with self-identified conservative voters.
5See, e.g., http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/02/05/super.exit/.
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who name “experience” as the most important quality,6 while the outsider/populist categories (“cares
about people like me,” “takes strong stands,” “can shake things up”) goes predominantly to Edwards
and Dean. Both Lieberman and Clark do not register at sufficiently high levels in many states to
draw strong conclusions from exit polls. We use our judgment to categorize Lieberman (the 2000
Democratic vice-presidential candidate) as insider, and Clark (an anti-war general who had never run
for office before) as an outsider. By a similar argument, we classify Gore as insider and Bradley as
outsider in the 2000 election.
For these candidates and election contests, we obtain the vote percentage in the primary or caucus
of each state from the Federal Election Commission and major media sources. These vote shares are
reported in Tables A1 and A2. However, these shares do not sum up to 100 percent as they include
votes for candidates whom we dropped from our analysis, for candidates who have already withdrawn,
or for “uncommitted” delegates. We treat these votes as equivalent to abstention from weighing on
the choice of the party nominee. To ensure that vote shares representing serious votes sum up to
100% (as also assumed by the model), we rescale all the vote shares accordingly for the purpose of
econometric analysis. We supplement these data on the Presidential primaries with data from the
1992 Presidential election.7 The vote shares of the Presidential candidates Clinton and Perot are used
as variables that are correlated with a state’s ideological position. A high Perot vote share is expected
to be associated with populist preferences, while a high Clinton share in that 3-way race is expected
to be associated with liberal preferences. This data is also reported in Table A1.
3 Results
3.1 Non-Parametric Mean-Variance Analysis
We start our analysis by pooling all data and comparing the candidates’ average vote shares as a
function of the distribution of candidates in political positions. In this simple analysis, we do not
distinguish between parties, political positions within parties and the position of a state within the
sequence of the primary, but rather treat symmetrically all primary elections in which κ candidates in
one position and κ′ candidates in the opposite position compete. The advantage of this approach is that
it is not based on any specification assumptions. This advantage comes at the cost that the analysis
in this section is informal in nature and no formal statistical tests are performed. Also, we could
6For example, see http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/primaries/pages/epolls/IA/index.html.
7The 1992 general election results were obtained from Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, available at
http://www.uselectionatlas.org/.
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be missing systematic effects (e.g., differences in mean vote shares for different locations, differences
across parties, etc.). We discuss these limitations in more detail at the end of this subsection, before
proceeding to more formal analysis.
Let VoteShareκ,κ
′
j,y be the vote share of candidate j (measured on a 0-100% scale) who shares his
position a(j) with κ − 1 other candidates, while there are κ′ competitors in the opposite position









where ‖Ks,p,l,y‖ is the cardinality of the set of candidates in state contest s, political party p, political
location l, and year y, Nκ,κ
′
is the number of observations such that ‖Ks,p,0,y = κ‖ and ‖Ks,p,1,y = κ′‖,
and VoteSharej,s,y is vote share of candidate j in state contest s in year y.
We report the average VoteShareκ,κ
′
(i.e., the mean over all candidates) and its standard deviation
in Table 1, for all different candidate configurations that appear in our data. These results underpin
much of the parametric analysis described in the subsequent sections.
Consider the mean vote shares. If κ′ = 0 (i.e., all κ candidates are in the same position), then the
mean share of a candidate is, by definition, 1/κ. Remarkably, it never happens that all participants in
a primary belong to the same political position, and thus these configurations are not listed in Table 1.
If κ = κ′, then (again by definition) the mean share of each candidate is equal to 1/2κ. All other
reported values are the realized averages in the data.
From our discussion of differential substitutability between candidates, we have the following
expectations: First, a reduction in the number of candidates in the same position increases the average





Second, there is partial, but not complete “crowding out” among candidates in the same position:
A reduction in the number of candidates in the same position decreases the total vote share of the
candidates in that position because there are some cross-over voters who change to a candidate in the
opposite position. Formally, κ ·VoteShareκ,κ′ > (κ− 1) ·VoteShareκ−1,κ′ .
By-and-large, the data are consistent with these expectations. For example, when going from
three candidates in a 2-1 constellation to two candidates in a 1-1 constellation, the vote share of the
candidate in the previously crowded position increases from 28.6% to 50%, while the vote share of the
competitor increases only from 42.8% to 50% (remember that, by definition, when κ = κ′ = 1, the
average vote share of candidates is 0.5). Or, interpreted in the other direction: A very competitive race
between two candidates in different positions, each attracting 50 percent of the votes, can become very
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non-competitive when another candidate enters, because the lonely candidate now attracts significantly
more votes than each of his competitors. This vote-splitting may lead to the victory of a candidate
who would lose if he had only one competitor. Note also that, if positions were irrelevant for voters,
then entry by the third candidate would instead reduce the vote share of existing candidates to 1/3.
Similarly, going from a 3-2 to a 2-2 constellation increases the average vote share of one of the
initially more crowded candidates from 19.0% to 25%, while it increases the average share of the two
initially less crowded candidates only from 21.5% to 25%.8
Holding the total number of candidates fixed, the total vote share of all candidates in a specific
position is always increasing in the number of candidates in that position. For example, consider all
contests involving 5 candidates: Here, 4 × 17.9% = 71.6% > 3 × 19.0% = 57.0% > 2 × 21.5% =
43.0% > 28.3%. Thus, there is clearly diversion of votes from one candidate to another candidate in
the same location, but the more candidates are in a location, the bigger their combined share. The
same pattern holds for contests with 3 and 4 candidates.9
The only case that contradicts our expectations is going from a 4-1 constellation to a 3-1 constella-
tion, in which case the average vote share of a candidate in the crowded position decreases from 17.9%
to 17.3%. This is probably due to the small number of cases (there were only two state elections with
a 4-1 constellation, and six with a 3-1 constellation) and the absence of any controls. In particular,
the lonely candidate in a 3-1 constellation is doing surprisingly well, getting on average 48 percent of
the vote. This phenomenon is also responsible for the fact that going from 3-1 to 2-1 reduces the vote
share of the lonely candidate from 48.2% to 42.8%. The largest number of observations, and therefore
the highest level of confidence in the results, obtains for the case of two and three candidates.
To summarize, the results in Table 1 are indicative of asymmetric candidate substitutability based
on their political positions. Vote shares decline with the number of candidates who share a location,
holding the total number of candidates constant. Moreover, the combined vote shares of candidates
in a location increases with the number of candidates in that location, holding the total number of
candidates constant.
Not distinguishing the election sequencing does not lead to any biases for the questions we address
8Of course, κ ·VoteShareκ,κ′ + κ′ ·VoteShareκ′,κ = 100 holds as an identity. Deviations from this in Table 1, such as
here where 3 × 17.3% + 48.2% = 100.1%, are due to rounding.
9The precise implications of the theory are for expected vote share comparisons between κ candidates in one position
and κ′ candidates in the other, versus κ− 1 in one position and κ′ in the other. But comparisons between κ candidates
in one position and κ′ in the other versus κ− 1 in one position and κ′ + 1 in the other can be obtained by applying our
theoretical result iteratively.
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with this analysis. Treating political parties and positions as fungible does not create any biases,
provided that the political locations do not differ systematically in voter popularity. Our analysis in
the next section suggests that this is indeed the case. As will become clear below, even if locations
were to differ systematically in voter popularity, no biases would result provided that there is no
systematic difference across political positions in the number of candidates in that position. Though
this is essentially true for the Democrats, it is not true for the Republicans (there are typically fewer
moderates than conservatives). But given that political positions do not differ much in popularity
among the voters, any differences in their “popularity” among politicians would not impact the validity
of our results. Overall, the main value of the analysis described here is the absence of any parametric
or modeling assumptions, except for those qualitative properties listed in this paragraph.
Since information about the sequence of elections has not be used in this analysis, it cannot
provide any evidence regarding the possibility of voter learning. Neither can it assess which of several
candidates in the same position benefits most if a state leans more toward these candidates’ common
position, which can be an indirect test of candidate differentiation. We address these questions in the
next two sections through the use of formal econometric specifications.
3.2 Econometric Analysis of Vote Shares
We now investigate the degree to which candidate vote shares depend on the field of competing
candidates, their political position, and a proxy for each state’s preference distribution. We do not
impose the structural assumptions of a theoretical model, but rather adopt a reduced form approach,
using progressively more flexible specifications.10 The findings are useful when thinking about which
type of theoretical model is consistent with the data. The primary benefit of a reduced form approach
is that it remains valid even if a model is somewhat misspecified, and that it allows us to derive a set
of separate facts which can help guide theory, rather than test a single model in its entirety.
Our simplest specification estimates the equation
VoteSharej,s,y = α+ β1CanDifj,s,y + β2CanOwnj,s,y + j,s,y (2)
where VoteSharej,s,y is the adjusted vote share of candidate j in state s and year y (measured on a 0–
100 scale), and CanOwnj,s,y and CanDifj,s,y is the number of candidate j’s competitors with the same
10However, we utilize for the purpose of inference the minimal information that candidate shares in a party’s state
primary in a given year are negatively correlated (even conditional on characteristics) and that candidate specific informa-
tion available in a given time is correlated across states. This is accomplished by using White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity
consistent standard errors with a two-way clustering at the state primary and candidate/round levels. Doing so tends to
be conservative for the purpose of testing (i.e. ignoring clustering reduces standard errors).
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or opposite political location, respectively, in state election s in year y. This specification essentially
parallels the nonparametric approach in the preceding section, but it uses a statistical framework and
thus provides the average effect of adding another candidate of the same or a different political position
and the associated standard errors. The findings, reported under Model 1 in Table 2, show that an
additional candidate in the same political location as candidate j reduces candidate j’s vote share by
three times as much as an additional candidate in the opposite location. The difference between the
two coefficients is also strongly statistically significant.
We next investigate whether this result is affected by the relative popularity of candidates of
different political positions. As reported under Model 2, this is not the case. In fact, once we control
for the number of candidates in each political location, the residual vote shares of candidates appear
not to be correlated with their political position, either for the Democratic or for the Republican Party.
We let Moderatej and Outsiderj be dummy variables that take the value 1 if candidate j is a moderate
Republican or Democratic “outsider” candidate, respectively, and 0 otherwise. In the regression
VoteSharej,s,y = α+ β1CanDifj,s,y + β2CanOwnj,s,y + γ1Moderatej + γ2Outsiderj + j,s,y (3)
the coefficients of γ1 and γ2 are both not statistically significant and small in numerical value (a differ-
ence of approximately one percent for either party). This does not imply that the average combined
vote share of candidates in each political location is the same. In fact, the average combined vote share
of moderate Republicans is approximately 43% while the average combined vote share of conservative
Republicans is 57%. However, Model 2 attributes this substantial difference to the fact that there are
more conservative than moderate Republican candidates. With conservative Republicans diverting a
disproportionate fraction votes from each other rather than from moderate Republicans, there is no
residual advantage to being conservative.11 We should also note that the coefficient of γ1 is largely a
McCain effect, as only two other Republican candidates (Giuliani and Romney in 2012) are labeled
as moderate. We therefore exclude the political location variables from subsequent analysis, except in
the Model 4 where by they enter in interaction form (and are thus also included in levels).
In the next regression (Model 3), we investigate whether the relevance of candidate political
location is confined to one of the two major parties, or is present in both. We do so by estimating
VoteSharej,s,y = α+ β1RCanDifj,s,yRepj + β2RCanOwnj,s,yRepj
+β1DCanDifj,s,yDemj + β2DCanOwnj,s,yDemj + j,s,y (4)
11The average combined share of the two political locations for Democratic primaries is much closer (47.5% versus
52.5%) and similar to the difference implied by the regression coefficient γ2. This is due to the fact that the Democratic
candidates are more evenly distributed between the two political positions.
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where the variable Repj takes the value of one if candidate j is a Republican and zero otherwise, and
the variable Demj takes the value of one if candidate j is a Democrat and zero otherwise. In this
model, the parameters β1 and β2 are estimated for each party separately. The results, reported in
Table 2, suggest that voter segmentation across political locations might be more pronounced for the
Democratic Party, where a candidate’s vote share is only negligibly affected by competing against one
fewer candidate in the opposing political location, but is very strongly affected by one fewer candidate
in the same political location. The relative effect of the location of competing candidates is also
statistically significant for the Republican primaries, but smaller in quantitative terms.12
The next two regressions (Models 4 and 5) are not aimed at directly estimating the vote diversion
effects but rather at evaluating whether our political location measures do indeed correspond plausibly
to voter preferences. Because the winner of each party’s primary was that party’s candidate in the
general election, we do not use the outcome of the 2000, 2004, 2008 or 2012 presidential elections
as a proxy for the distribution of political preferences in a state. Instead, our proxy is the outcome
of the 1992 presidential election between Bush, Clinton and Perot. Voter preferences in states in
which Clinton did well are plausibly shifted to the left relative to the rest of the country, and we
would therefore also expect that moderate Republicans do better in these states than conservatives.
Similarly, states in which Perot did well likely have a larger than average share of populist voters, so
that we expect that candidates classified as outsiders do better. The equation of Model 4 is given by
VoteSharej,s,y = α+ β1CanDifj,s,y + β2CanOwnj,s,y + γ1Moderatej + γ2Outsiderj
+γ1CModeratejClinton92%s + γ2POutsiderjPerot92%s + j,s,y (5)
and the one of the much more flexible Model 5 by
VoteSharej,s,y = αj,t,y + γ1CModeratejClinton92%s + γ2POutsiderjPerot92%s + j,s,y (6)
where Perot92%s and Clinton92%s are Perot’s and Clinton’s vote share in state s in the 1992 Presi-
dential election, respectively,13 and αj,t,y are candidate×year×round effects, i.e., coefficients on a set
of dummies that take the value of 1 for a particular candidate for all state elections taking place on a
12Adding location dummies to this regression does not materially affect the estimates for the Democratic coefficients,
but renders the Republican location effect to essentially zero. However, with Moderatei being essentially a dummy for
McCain, the Republican effect would be identified solely from the gain of voters by McCain as other candidates (of
opposing location) depart, relative to the gain of voters by his opponents as other candidates (of same location) depart.
Not only the effective information for this specification is even more limited (only 4 such withdrawals) but with McCain
being a higher quality candidate, the location and valence effects are confounded (McCain gets a bigger than expected
share of the departing candidates’ voters because he is a better candidate in the vertical dimension).
13The vote share variables Clinton92%s and Perot92%s, like VoteSharej,s,y range from 0 to 100.
11
particular day (round) in a given year, and zero otherwise. These dummies would perfectly predict the
share of a candidate for election days in which only a single state votes, completely eliminating their
influence on the remaining model parameters. Thus, we drop observations that consist of a single state
contest from the regression in Model 5, reducing the number of observations from 502 to 382. The
more flexible specification of Model 5 allows us to test the vote shifting effect across political positions
without relying on any parametric assumptions on substitutability between candidates and controlling
for any other variables that vary across election rounds (including perceived candidate valence).
As explained above, the expected Clinton effect is an increase in the vote share of moderate
Republicans. This appears indeed to be the case, as the coefficients γ1C are positive and statis-
tically significant for both models. Each percentage point won by Clinton in 1992 translates into
approximately a 0.75 percentage point gain for moderate Republican candidates. The Perot effect on
Democratic outsider candidates is (marginally) significant only in Model 5 (i.e., the point estimate of
γ2P is positive), while it is essentially zero for Model 4. The fact that the evidence is not as strong as
for the Republicans may be a consequence of most of Perot’s voters being conservative populists, so
that the influence on the Democratic primary electorate is rather weak.
A consequence of candidate differentiation is that as the electorate policy preferences shift towards
one political position, the candidates that share that political position are expected to benefit. In
fact, it would be reasonable to expect that, among candidates sharing a position, the ones with higher
valence would obtain a greater number of votes as the electorate shifts towards that position (compared
to candidates with lower valence). But it would also be reasonable to expect that the vote share of the
lower valence candidates would experience a larger proportionate increase, because a weak candidate’s
voters include a disproportionately small number of people with opposing policy preferences. These
conjectures are formalized in section 4. Our final set of regressions, Models 6 and 7, are intended to
ascertain whether they are also supported by the data, thus buttressing the support of our framework
over the alternatives. These conjectures are hard to test because they demand much from our limited
data (we only observe proxies of voter preferences), and also because they require an operative measure
of candidate valence. It is important to recall that valence, as perceived by the voters, is not constant
throughout the sequence of elections, but rather changes from round to round, suggesting that any
estimation approach should be based on variants of Model 5.
We adopt as our proxy for valence in round t the vote average share of a candidate in that
round, MeanShrj,t,y. Clearly this is an imperfect measure, but a reasonable one. Candidates with
high relative valence, as perceived in round t, will have higher values of MeanShrj,t,y. The number
and distribution of competing candidates will also affect the values of MeanShrj,t,y. To reduce these
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candidate composition effects on this measure, we employ this measure in regressions that also include
candidate× round effects, as in Model 5.14 Moreover, averaging vote shares of all contests in a round
is meaningful because all states have the same ex ante expectations about valence which they update
independently on the basis of their privately observed signal. In addition, the set of candidates is the
same in all such contests. However, adding MeanShrj,t,y on the right hand of the regression suffers
from a serious shortcoming: a higher than expected vote share by a candidate in a particular state
would lead to a higher value of MeanShrj,t,y. Such positive correlation leads to an upward bias in the
regression coefficients of MeanShrj,t,y and its interactions (albeit not a large one when many states
are holding their primary in the same time).
A specification (Model 6) that does not suffer from this endogeneity short-coming is:
VoteSharej,s,y = αj,t,y + γ1CModeratejClinton92%s + γ2POutsiderjPerot92%s
+ {γ1Cs1Moderatej + γ1Cs0[1−Moderatej ]}Clinton92%sMeanShrj,t/s,y (7)
+ {γ1Ps1Outsiderj + γ1Ps0[1−Outsiderj ]}Perot92%sMeanShrj,t/s,y + j,s,y
where MeanShrj,t/s,y is the average vote share of candidate j in the contests taking place in round
t in year y, excluding the contest in state s.15 This specification, too, however, has a potential
endogeneity concern, though one of ambiguous sign (and possibly of zero magnitude).16 A more
conservative approach is to lag the MeanShrj,t,y variable by one round, i.e., use as a proxy of valence
MeanShrj,t−1,y. This yields Model 7 below.
VoteSharej,s,y = αj,t,y + γ1CModeratejClinton92%s + γ2POutsiderjPerot92%s
+ {γ1Cs1Moderatej + γ1Cs0[1−Moderatej ]}Clinton92%sMeanShrj,t−1,y (8)
+ {γ1Ps1Outsiderj + γ1Ps0[1−Outsiderj ]}Perot92%sMeanShrj,t−1,y + j,s,y
14The theoretical model shows that the effect of changes in electorate preferences on candidate shares depends not
only on the candidate’s valence and political position but also on the number of competing candidates, their valence, and
their political position. The variable MeanShrj,t,y also adjusts for the number of competing candidates, their valence
and political position, and thus in a qualitative way reflects the factors that enter in the comparative statics developed
by the theoretical model.
15Note that, by necessity, this specification uses a different proxy for every state, since the variable MeanShr no longer
takes the same value for all states in a given round.
16To see this, suppose there are only two states, 1 and 2 in a given round t, and that the mean share enters directly as a
regressor (rather than as an interaction). Then, the share of candidate j in state 1 is V Sj,1 = BXj,1+γV Sj,2+j,1, where
BX contains all other regressors, and the year subscript is suppressed. The vote share for state 2 is given analogously.




1−γ2 , and similarly for V Sj,2. It can
be seen from the reduced form expressions for the vote shares that the share in state 2 is positively correlated with the
structural error in regression equation for the vote share in state 1 (γ < 1).
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This specification is not necessarily better than the one in (7) for two reasons. First, lagging the mean
share provides a more noisy measure of perceived valence for round t because it does not include the
signals received in that round. Second, the set of candidates is no longer guaranteed to be the same
across round t and t− 1, and this introduces an additional source of noise in the valence proxy.
We therefore estimate Model 6 and Model 7 and discuss their results of these regressions together.
For the Republican candidates, the results are stronger for the second specification (largely because
of smaller standard errors). Moderate Republicans do better than conservatives in states with strong
support for Clinton in 1992, and this difference is broadly independent of their vote share (the coeffi-
cients γ1Cs1 and γ1Cs0 are similar in size). Consistent with our intuition, high valence (high average
vote share) conservatives are hurt proportionately less than low valence conservatives in states with
strong Clinton support.17 Somewhat surprisingly, high valence moderates not only benefit proportion-
ately less than low valence moderates in states with strong Clinton support, but also benefit less in
absolute terms.18 Thus, for Republican candidates, the data support the notion that relatively weak
candidates are more sensitive (at least in relative terms) to shifts in electorate preferences, as would
be expected if candidates where differentiated by political position.
For the Democratic candidates, the two models differ somewhat in their results. Model 6 suggests
that Perot’s strength in 1992 is associated with essentially proportional effects on candidates for
different average voting shares: Outsiders do better in states that voted heavily for Perot and insiders
do better in states that did not, but weak candidates do not get a proportionately bigger boost than
strong candidates. Model 7, however, does provide strong support for the theoretical predictions. In
fact, as in the case with the Republican candidates, the data indicate that not only the relative weak
candidates are more sensitive (in relative terms) to shifts in electorate preferences, but that in the
case of outsiders they appear to be more sensitive even in absolute terms.
3.3 Econometric Analysis of Share Variability
We now analyze how vote share variability evolves over the course of the primaries, and show that
its evolution is best explained by voter learning. Even with complete information about candidate
attributes, the vote shares of candidates would vary across states because voter preferences for positions
differ. Uncertainty about candidate quality provides an additional component of vote share variability,
and since this uncertainty is slowly resolved over time, the theoretical model posits that vote share
17The effect for conservatives is equal to −γ1C − γ1Cs0MeanShrj,t−s,y.
18The coefficient γ1Cs1 is negative. Since mean vote shares for moderates are rarely above sixty percent, the combined
effect γ1C + γ1Cs1 ∗MeanShrj,t−s,y is positive almost everywhere.
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variability declines over time. Moreover, since additional information moves perceptions (and thus
vote shares) by a progressively smaller amount, the largest decline in variability should happen early,
and be related to the level of information received (proxied by the number of states that have already
voted) rather than to the simple passage of time.
Estimates of vote share variability necessarily have to be based on the analysis of the residuals
of equations of the form estimated in the preceding section. We need to ensure that the greatest
proportion of systematic variation in vote shares is removed, without removing any component of the
residuals that helps identify learning effects or introducing any biases in the estimation of such effects.
With respect to estimating the reduction in variability due to learning, all parameters associated with
systematic differences in the expected vote shares are nuisance parameters: We do not care about
their values here, except that they are accounted for as best as possible. Our base model to obtain the
residuals has an exhaustive set of candidate× round× year dummies. The residuals indicate whether
a candidate did better or worse in a state relative to how he did in other states that voted on the
same date. It controls for the very identity of competing candidates (rather than merely their political
position and number) in the most flexible way: with indicator variables whose coefficients vary (with
no parametric constraints) over time. This regression is equivalent to Models 5, 6, and 7 without the
Clinton and Perot effects, does not rely on our classification of candidates into political locations or
on any of the other aspects of our specification that involve candidate competition.
We also estimate vote share variability using the residuals of the more heavily parameterized
Models 5, 6, and 7. By their very nature, the results here would differ somewhat for each specific
parametrization of the Clinton and Perot effects. Since we focus here on the time variation of the
residuals, we report as a representative model the results based on Model 6, which is one the two most
flexible specifications and uses the same valence proxy variable for all elections in a given round.19
Let NumCandj,s,y be the number of candidates contesting state s in year y for the party of
candidate j, and let PriorSignalsj,s,y be the number of state contests for the party of candidate j
prior to state s. We estimate the regressions
|ˆj,s,y| = a+ b NumCandj,s,y + c PriorSignalsj,s,y + uj,s,y (9)
and
|ˆj,s,y| = a+ b NumCandj,s,y + c PriorSignalsj,s,y + d PriorSignals2j,s,y + uj,s,y (10)
where |ˆj,s,y| is the residual from either Model 6, or from Model 5/6/7 without the Perot and Clinton
19The residuals of the other two models give similar results (except that when using the residuals of Model 7, the
quadratic term in (10) is no longer statistically significant, though it remains of the same sign).
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interaction terms. The number of candidates is included as a variable in the regression because a higher
number of candidates means smaller vote shares (on average), and smaller vote shares exhibit smaller
variances. We also re-estimate regressions (9) and (10) making a small sample adjustment for residuals
that accounts for the fact that OLS residuals are a biased estimate of disturbance variance when




)0.5 |ˆj,s,y| as the dependent variable,
where mj,s,y is the number of candidates in the party of candidate j for state s in year y.
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This yields a total of eight regressions, whose results are reported in Table 3. Consistent with our
expectations, residual variance is decreasing with the number of prior contests for all specifications (an
effect that is statistically significant in all regressions at the 10 percent level (in 7 out of 8 regressions
at the 5 percent level). Moreover, since voters initially have weaker priors about candidates, new
information can move their opinions more easily, which implies that vote share variability should
decline fastest in the early rounds. Consistent with this expectation, we find that the coefficient of
PriorSignals2j,s,y is positive in all specifications and statistically significant at the 10 percent level
in two of them. In fact, the marginal effect of more contests approaches zero towards the end of the
primaries: it appears that there is no further reduction in voter uncertainty about candidates towards
the end of the typical primary run. Finally, the number of candidates has a negative effect on variance,
as expected, though the effect is typically not statistically significant when we adjust the dependent
variable for the number of candidates.
Even though this variability reduction effect due to learning from earlier election results is sta-
tistically significant and exhibits the expected diminishing pattern, it is quantitatively small relative
to other factors: it explains only about 2 to 5 percent of the residual variance. Evidently, there are
several other determinants of vote share variability, including the type of information shocks that lead
to learning about candidate valence in the first place, and possible co-ordination of voters across states
voting simultaneously.21
The second of these two possibilities is of special concern, because it could lead to a systematic
relationship between variance and number of signals or rounds. Suppose that voters in early states
can coordinate on a candidate of a particular political position (perhaps through local press coverage)
but cannot coordinate across states. In this scenario, a candidate may obtain many votes in one state
(if voters coordinate on him) but very few on another state that votes at the same round (if voters
there coordinate on his opponent). Thus, candidate share variability would be relatively high in early
20This adjustment is exact when no covariates are used.
21It is not surprising, and in fact reassuring, that when one includes the variable PriorSignalsj,s,y in the vote share
regressions it comes out uniformly insignificant.
16
states. Later, coordination across states increases, as voters observe who is likely to emerge as the
most competitive candidate in a particular political position. This effect would lead to a reduction in
share variability, even in the absence of any firming of priors about quality, based only on coordination
across states.
To test whether this alternative explanation is the driving force behind the reduction of share
variability, note that it implies that vote share residuals for candidates in the same political position
should be strongly negatively correlated and largely cancel out. Vote share variability at the political
position level, controlling for candidate mean shares, should not have a clear trend over time. We test
this prediction by summing the vote share residuals of candidates in the same political position in a
particular state contest. We then perform the same analysis described in equations (9) and (10) using
the aggregated residuals of Model 6. Note that the right-hand side variables take the same values for
candidates competing in the same state contest, so that these regressions only differ in the construction
of the dependent variable (and in the number of observations). The estimates are reported in the first
4 columns of Table 4. The pattern of coefficient estimates is unchanged: share variability, measured at
the position level, declines for later contests. Statistical significance is affected when both the number
of signals and the number of signals squared are used as regressors; however, the two variables remain
jointly statistically significant. We conclude that increased coordination of voters across states voting
contemporaneously is not an explanation for the reduction of share variability.
There is also another observation that supports our interpretation that the reduction in variability
is due to hardening priors as more information about the candidates becomes available. If one were to
use a simple counter of the election round in (9) and (10), i.e., a variable that is akin to a time trend
and does not take into consideration the number of states that vote in a given round, the coefficients
on that variable are statistically insignificant. This is reported in the last four columns of Table 4 for
the counterparts of the regressions in Table 3 (omitting the quadratic models). Thus, it is not the
passage of time that is associated with reduced variability, but rather the number of states that voted
previously.
4 Explaining the Results: Formal Analysis of a Framework
In this section, we will argue that the model developed in Deltas, Herrera, and Polborn (2016) is
consistent with set of results presented in the preceding section. For convenience, we summarize the
key features of this model here, before proceeding to formal analysis. Let J = {1, . . . , J} denote the
set of candidates who compete for their party’s nomination. The set of states is S, with typical state
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s. States vote sequentially, though some may vote at the same time. Voters observe the outcome in
all states that voted before their own. The set of candidates in later elections may be a strict subset
of the set of candidates in early elections, as some candidates may drop out.
Candidates differ in two dimensions. First, parameter vj measures candidate j’s valence (which is
a characteristic like competence appreciated by all voters). Second, there is a binary characteristic on
which candidates are exogenously fixed either to position 0 or to position 1, as in Krasa and Polborn
(2010). One can think of the binary characteristic as an ideological position. This setup is the simplest
one to formalize the idea that some candidates are close policy substitutes for voters, while there is a
substantial difference to some other candidates. The first j0 candidates are fixed at aj = 0, while the
other j1 = J − j0 candidates are fixed at aj = 1.
Voter i’s utility from a victory of candidate j is
U ij = vj − λ|aj − θi|+ εij . (11)
Here, θi is voter i’s preferred position on the fixed characteristic, and λ measures the weight of the fixed
characteristic relative to valence. The proportion of the total population in district s with preference
for a = 1 is µs ∈ (0, 1), which is common knowledge among all players. The last term, εij , drawn
from N(0, σε
2) is an individual preference shock of voter i for candidate j, reflecting variation among
candidates in other dimensions for which voters have different preferences. In this case, the fixed
characteristic modeled explicitly (aj = 0 or aj = 1) should be understood as the most important
policy dimension. Without loss of generality, we normalize σε = 1.
Voters are uncertain about the candidates’ valences, which are independent draws from a normal
distribution N(0, σv
2). Voters cannot observe vj directly. Instead, voters in electoral district s observe
a signal Zsj = vj + η
s
j about candidate j, where the additional term, η
s
j , is an independent draw from
a normal distribution N(0, ση
2). Note that ηsj is state-specific.
22
Given their own signal, and possibly the election results in earlier states from which the signals
in those earlier states can be inferred, voters rationally update their beliefs. Let vˆsj denote the valence
of candidate j that is expected by voters in district s. Each voter votes sincerely. That is, voter i in
district s that votes at time t votes for candidate j if and only if
j ∈ arg max
j′∈J t
vˆsj′ − λ|aj′ − θi|+ εij′ , (12)
22The idea is that voters in the same state receive their news about the candidates from the same local news sources so
that the errors are not individual-specific. To simplify the model and gain some tractability, we ignore nationally-observed
errors, though these are accounted for in the estimation.
18
where J t is the set of candidates in period t elections.23
Deltas, Herrera, and Polborn (2016) show that, given that the beliefs of voters in state s are given
by the vector vˆs = (vˆs1, vˆ
s
2, . . . , vˆ
s




























(−λ+ εj + vˆsj − vˆsj′) · φ(εj)dεj (13)






























) · φ(εj)dεj (14)
where Φ(·) and φ(·) denote the cumulative distribution and the probability density function of the
standard normal distribution N(0, 1), respectively (recall ε is distributed N(0, 1)), and Jsp denote the
set of candidates with position p ∈ {0, 1} who are running in state s.
Because the model is analytically involved, it is not always possible to prove that the comparative
statics results hold for any arbitrary parameter combinations (though the analysis below suggests that
they are in fact valid quite generally). However, we show numerically that they hold for a broad range
of parameter values, including at the point estimates in Deltas, Herrera, and Polborn (2016).
Effect of drop-outs. Consider a situation in which there are initially three candidates, two of whom
(say, A and B) have position 0, while the third one (C) has position 1. What happens to the support
of candidates B and C, when candidate A drops out? It is useful to define the total number of voters
who rank candidate A highest and candidate B second as RAB; let RAC be defined analogously. In
the Appendix, we show that
RAB = (1− µ)
∫ ∞
−∞




[Φ (vˆA − vˆB − ε) Φ (vˆB − vˆC − λ+ ε)]φ(ε)dε
(15)
and
RAC = (1− µ)
∫ ∞
−∞




[Φ (vˆA − vˆC − λ+ ε) Φ (vˆC − vˆB + λ− ε)]φ(ε)dε
(16)
23Since we focus on the implications of voters’ learning and preferences for vote shares, the specific rules for who wins
the nomination do not matter; therefore, we are silent on this.
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Whenever RAB/RAC > 1, B profits more than C from A’s withdrawal, and vice versa. In general,
the ratio RAB/RAC can be larger or smaller than 1. However, the expectation of RAB/RAC , taken
over vˆj and µ, is positive for both the estimated Democratic and Republican parameter values from
Deltas, Herrera, and Polborn (2016). These expected values remain substantially above 1 for a range of
parameter values around the point estimates, or when a mix of Republican and Democratic estimates
are used. This theoretical result corresponds well to the empirical results reported in Section 3.1.
The effects of learning candidate valence over time. We now discuss voter updating of valence.
Recall that voters in each state receive a normally distributed signal of candidate j’s valence with
expected value vj and variance σ
2
η. Suppose the ex-ante belief about candidate j’s valence before
seeing the state-s-specific signal is distributed according to N(vˆj0, σ
2
j0). If the state-specific signal is
Zsj , one can use Bayes’ rule to derive the ex-post density of the candidate’s valence, which normal but


























v . What is the information of voters in states voting
later before they see their state’s signal? Remember that these voters observe the vote share of each
candidate j in each earlier state r, W rj , and know µ
r. Using (13) and (14), the election in state r is
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) · φ(εj)dεj = W rj ,∀j ∈ Jr1 (19)
The following proposition shows that observing the vote shares of all candidates in district r allows
voters in later states to essentially recover the valence signal of state r.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique vector (0, x2, x3, . . . xk) such that all solutions of (19) are of
the form (0, x2, x3, . . . , xk) + (c, c, . . . , c), c ∈ R.
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Proof. See Appendix.
It is immaterial which of these possible solutions to (19) a voter takes as his ex-ante belief, as a






for each candidate, leaving the difference between the valence estimates for the different candidates,
and hence the voter’s voting decision, unaffected. The vote shares are determined only by the difference
between the candidates’ valences, so we can normalize candidate A’s estimated valence to zero.
Our next result, Proposition 2, shows that, as the primaries progress, the variation of beliefs about
candidate valences across those states that vote at the same time diminishes. This is intuitive since
late-voting states share a lot of common information and thus, the differences in beliefs generated by
the fact that each state receives its own state-specific signal are not as large as they are in early states.
Proposition 2 Consider the expected variance of the valence estimates in all states that vote at time
t. This variance is decreasing in t.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, a lower variance of the valence estimates in later states translates into a lower variance
of a candidate’s vote shares in late states, relative to early states. In particular, this is clear in the
limit: If there is (almost) no remaining uncertainty about candidates’ valences, then vote shares in late
states depend only on µs and are otherwise completely deterministic. Any randomness in the valence
estimate across late states must increase the variance of the candidates’ vote shares. The prediction
of Proposition 2 is borne out by the empirical results reported in Section 3.3 above.
Effect of partisan composition To analyze the effect of the level of µ in different states on the
support of different candidates, let us focus on the case where there are initially three candidates, two
of whom (say, A and B) have position 0, while the third one (C) has position 1. A decrease in µ
benefits the vote shares of candidates A and B. Candidate A benefits at least as much as candidate B
if and only if ∫ ∞
−∞
Φ (vA − vB + ε) [Φ (λ+ vA − vC + ε)− Φ (−λ+ vA − vC + ε)]φ(ε)dε−∫ ∞
−∞
Φ (vB − vA + ε) [Φ (λ+ vB − vC + ε)− Φ (−λ+ vB − vC + ε)]φ(ε)dε ≥ 0.
(20)
Without loss of generality, suppose that vA > vB. Whether (20) holds in general is difficult to
determine. However, for λ = 0, (20) obviously holds as equality, and for λ sufficiently large, the left-
hand and right-hand sides go to
∫∞
−∞Φ (vA − vB + ε)φ(ε)dε and
∫∞
−∞Φ (vB − vA + ε)φ(ε)dε, so that
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(20) is satisfied as strict inequality. Moreover, the left-hand side of (20) is positive (in expectation
over valence draws) at the estimated parameter values in Deltas, Herrera, and Polborn (2016).
We now focus on relative changes. Proposition 3 shows that, if λ is sufficiently large, then the
weaker candidate benefits proportionately more than the strong candidate (i.e., relative to previous
vote share) from a favorable ideological shift of the electorate.
Proposition 3 Suppose that both candidate A and B are in position 0, while candidate C is in position
1. Furthermore, suppose that vˆA > vˆB. There exists λ
∗ such that for all λ ≥ λ∗, an increase in 1− µ
increases the vote share of B by a larger percentage than the vote share of A (relative to their respective
previous vote shares).
Proof. See Appendix.
We conjecture that Proposition 3 holds more generally, for any λ, but again this is hard to prove.
However, as above, we can also check that Proposition 3 holds around the estimated parameter values
by Deltas, Herrera, and Polborn (2016). This result is supported by the estimates in Section 3.2.
5 Concluding Remarks
The results of this paper demonstrate that ideological differentiation between candidates leads to sub-
stantial vote-splitting among those who are ideologically-similar. Therefore, multi-candidate primary
elections may be severely affected by coordination failures because the candidate who ends up with a
plurality of votes is not necessarily preferred by a majority of the electorate to all of his competitors.
This vote-splitting effect presents a substantial problem for the efficiency of any voting system when
more than two candidates run in an election, because a weaker candidate (i.e., not the Condorcet
winner) might win in a situation where the Condorcet winner is splitting votes with a close ideological
neighbor. The U.S. presidential primary system provides a unique opportunity to gauge the presence
and size of this vote-splitting effect, because some candidates drop out during the primaries, and the
voters that would have voted for a dropped-out candidate need to choose which of the remaining
candidates to support. The sequential nature of the primaries also allows us to infer, using the pattern
of decline in vote share variability, that voters are becoming better informed about candidate quality
by observing the outcomes of earlier election rounds.
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6 Appendix
Derivation of (15) and (16). To calculate the number of voters who rank candidate j highest and
candidate j′ second, consider first the case that both candidates j and j′ have the same position, say,
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a = 0 (i.e., j, j′ ∈ J0). A voter of type θ ranks j highest and j′ second if and only if
vˆsj + εj − λd(j, θ) ≥ vˆsj′ + εj′ − λd(j′, θ) ≥ max
k 6=j,j′
(vˆsk + εk − λd(k, θ)). (21)
Consider first the second inequality (i.e., the one that secures that j′ is preferred to every candidate
except j). For a given εj′ , the second inequality in (21) is satisfied if and only if
εk < vˆ
s
j′ − vˆsk + εj′ − λ[d(j′, θ)− d(k, θ)] for all k 6= j, j′ . (22)
Since the εk’s are distributed independently N(0, 1), the probability that a voter of type θ = 0 ranks














Turning to the first inequality in (21), it must also be true that εj ≥ εj′ + vˆsj′ − vˆsj , which, for given










vˆsj − vˆsj′ − εj′
)
, where the equality uses the identity
1− Φ(x) = Φ(−x) for the cdf of the normal distribution.
Integrating over the possible realizations of εj′ gives that the proportion of type 0 voters who














λ+ εj′ + vˆ
s
j′ − vˆsk
) · φ(εj′)dεj′ . (24)















(−λ+ εj′ + vˆsj′ − vˆsk) · φ(εj′)dεj′ . (25)
The total proportion of voters who rank candidate j highest and candidate j′ second (where both





































j′ − vˆsk − λ
) · φ(εj′)dεj′ (26)
We now turn to the case that the position of candidate j′ is a = 1. Proceeding as above, with the
necessary adjustments, one can show that the total proportion of voters who rank candidate j highest






































) · φ(εj′)dεj′ .
(27)
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Analogous conditions to (26) and (27) can be derived for candidate j being located at a = 1.
Equations (15) and (16) are special cases of (26) and (27). 
Proof of Proposition 1. Existence follows by construction: Since the vector W r is generated
using the realized vector of estimated valences (vˆrj )j=1,...,k, a solution to (19) exists. Furthermore,
it is clear that any vector of the form (0, x2, x3, . . . , xk) + (c, c, . . . , c) also satisfies (19). It remains
to be shown that there cannot be a solution of the form (0, y2, y3, . . . , yk) with (0, y2, y3, . . . , yk) 6=
(0, x2, x3, . . . , xk). Assume to the contrary, and let k¯ be the candidate for whom yj−xj is maximal. If
yk¯ − xk¯ > 0, then substituting in the corresponding equation of (19) shows that candidate k¯ receives
a strictly higher vote share than W r
k¯
, a contradiction. Similarly, let k be the candidate for whom
yj − xj is minimal. If yk − xk < 0, then substituting in the corresponding equation of (19) shows that
candidate k receives a strictly smaller vote share than W rk , a contradiction. But then, it must be true
that yj = xj for all j = 2, . . . , k.
Proof of Proposition 2. Each state voting at time t has a different estimate of candidate j’s






























Now consider the average estimated valence of candidate j in those states that vote simultaneously
at some later date t, and its variance. Suppose there are R earlier elections, indexed by r. The sum
of state-specific signals for candidate j is distributed N(Rvj , Rσ
2
η), so that the average state-specific
signal is distributed N(vj , σ
2
η/R). The ex-ante estimate in late states (i.e., before the state-specific

























In addition, each late state receives its own signal Zsj of variance σ
2
η. The ex-post estimate of candi-

























The first term comes from the ex-ante estimate and is the same for all states that vote at time t. These
states differ only by their signals Zsj , and the variance of the valence estimate in late states (around
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2 · V ar(Zsj ), (33)
which is clearly decreasing in the number of states R that voted earlier. Since R is increasing in t,
this proves the claim.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let V Si denote the overall vote share of candidate i, and let V Si,j
denote candidate i’s vote share among voters of type j. Clearly, V Si = (1− µ)V Si,0 + µV Si,1. When






V SA,0 − V SA,1







V SB,0 − V SB,1
(1− µ)V SB,0 + µV SB,1 (35)







A type 0 voter prefers candidate A to B if and only if vA + εA ≥ vB + εB. If λ is large, so that there
are almost no cross-over voters (i.e., type 0 voters who vote for C, or type 1 voters who vote for A or











Consider now the term on the left-hand side of (36). The probability that a type 1 voter ranks
both A and B higher than C is exceedingly small for λ large and neglected in the following. A




















































)2−t2 = vA−vB2 (vA−vB−2√2t)
is decreasing in t, and is positive for all t ≤ vA−vC−λ√
2
, provided that λ is sufficiently large (clearly,
λ ≥ vA − vC is a sufficient condition for this). Thus, substituting the upper limit of the integral
for t, the integrand in the denominator is at most exp
(







integrand in the numerator, and thus the same relation holds for the values of the two integrals. Since
this factor goes to zero as λ grows, (37) goes to infinity, which proves that (36) holds for λ sufficiently
large. This proves the claim.
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Table 1. Key statistics for various candidate configurations.
Mean Share Observations Number of Distinct Candidates
Mean Obs per 
Candidate
2 Candidates in the election:
  1 candidate in same location 50.0% 168 8 21.0
3 Candidates in the election:
  2 candidates in same location 28.6% 150 10 15.0
  1 candidate in same location 42.8% 75 5 15.0
4 Candidates in the election:
  3 candidates in same location 17.3% 18 6 3.0
  2 candidates in same location 25.0% 4 4 1.0
  1 candidate in same location 48.2% 6 2 3.0
5 Candidates in the election:
  4 candidates in same location 17.9% 8 4 2.0
  3 candidates in same location 19.0% 39 6 6.5
  2 candidates in same location 21.5% 26 4 6.5
  1 candidate in same location 28.3% 2 1 2.0
Notes: See text for a description of these statistics.

















0.75 0.74 2.48 1.40





-0.02 0.51 1.14 0.31





65.44 65.96 65.37 65.63 na na na
4.16 4.32 4.14 4.33 na na na







Party effects (p-value) 0.9897 0.2583
Moderate and "Outsider" effects (p-value) 0.9230 0.0007
Perot and Clinton effects (p-value) 0.0000 0.0068 0.0000 0.0100
Candidate * election round effects (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
MeanShare effects (p-value) 0.0000 0.0036
R-squared 0.3043 0.3051 0.3137 0.3165 0.7338 0.7929 0.7560
OwnLocation - Different Location (Dem)
Notes: N=502 for Models 1-4. N=382 for Models 5-7. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors, clustered by both 
party/state/round and candidate/round (Models 1-4) and by party/state/round (Models 5-7), are reported in italics below the 
parameter and parameter difference estimates. Bold entries indicate parameter significance at the 5% level, underlined entries 
indicate significance at the 10% level. See text for details.
"Outsider" (Dem) * Perot92%
"Outsider" (Dem) * Perot92% * MeanShare
"Insider" (Dem) * Perot92% * MeanShare
Constant
OwnLocation - Different Location




Moderate (Rep) * Clinton92%
Moderate (Rep) * Clinton92% * MeanShare
Conservative (Rep) * Clinton92% * MeanShare






Table 3. Analysis of vote share variability in each election date/round.
-1.142 -1.283 -0.749 -0.948 -1.227 -1.269 -1.014 -1.069
0.460 0.494 0.525 0.549 0.431 0.453 0.435 0.457
-0.133 -0.309 -0.077 -0.325 -0.150 -0.203 -0.115 -0.184
0.043 0.143 0.049 0.158 0.034 0.128 0.037 0.135
0.004 0.006 0.001 0.002
0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003
13.500 14.941 12.590 14.619 12.400 12.827 11.975 12.545
1.924 2.373 2.070 2.479 1.769 2.122 1.798 2.160
Signal Effects (p-value) 0.0054 0.0745 0.0000 0.0067
R-squared 0.0351 0.0404 0.0112 0.0205 0.0521 0.0526 0.0292 0.0301





Notes: The dependent variable is the absolute value of the regression residual of Model 6 or Model 5/6/7 without the 
Clinton/Perot interactions with the candidate's political position. Correction for the number of candidates involves multiplying the 
residual by [m/(m-1)]^0.5, where m is the number of candidates competing in a state. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
errors, clustered by party/state/round, are reported in italics below the parameter estimates. Bold entries indicate parameter 
significance at the 5% level, underlined entries indicate significance at the 10% level. See text for details.
Model 5/6/7 without Clinton/Perot effects Model 6
using the raw value of 
the residual
correcting for the number 
of candidates
using the raw value of 
the residual
correcting for the number 
of candidates









0.292 0.273 0.696 0.670 -0.429 -0.114 -0.731 -0.609
0.694 0.698 0.718 0.721 0.498 0.555 0.464 0.473
-0.140 -0.182 -0.103 -0.160
0.034 0.146 0.037 0.156
0.001 0.001
0.003 0.003
-0.012 0.137 -0.216 -0.147
0.174 0.191 0.151 0.158
9.053 9.360 8.222 8.642 9.884 8.798 10.692 10.465
2.198 2.440 2.265 2.513 2.570 2.755 2.308 2.377
Signal Effects (p-value) 0.0002 0.0192
R-squared 0.0688 0.0691 0.0483 0.0489 0.0030 0.0038 0.0106 0.0060





Notes: The dependent variable for the first four regressions is the absolute value of the sum of the residuals of all 
candidates in the same political position (in a given state contest); in the remaining regressions it is the absolute value of 
the regression residual of Model 6 or Model 5/6/7 without the Clinton/Perot interactions with the candidate's political 
position. Correction for the number of candidates involves multiplying the residual by [m/(m-1)]^0.5, where m is the 
number of candidates competing in a state. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors, clustered by 
party/state/round, are reported in italics below the parameter estimates. Bold entries indicate parameter significance at 
the 5% level, underlined entries indicate significance at the 10% level. See text for details.
Model 6 aggregate residuals by political position Model 5/6/7 (stripped) Model 6
using the raw value of 
the residual
correcting for the 
number of candidates
NumberOfCandidates
Table A-1. Election Data: The 1992 General Election and the 2000 and 2012 primaries.
1992 Election
State Clinton Perot rd Brad Gore rd Bauer Bush Frbs Keyes McC rd Gngr Rmn Sntrm
Alabama 41% 11% 13 29% 29% 35%
Alaska 30% 28% 11 14% 32% 29%
Arizona 37% 24% 5 53% 5% 42% 8 16% 47% 27%
Arkansas 53% 10%
California 46% 21% 5 18% 81% 7 61% 4% 35%
Colorado 40% 23% 6 13% 35% 40%
Connecticut 42% 22% 5 42% 55% 7 46% 3% 49%
DC 85% 4%
Delaware 44% 20% 3 3 51% 20% 4% 25%
Florida 39% 20% 4 32% 46% 13%
Georgia 43% 13% 5 16% 84% 7 67% 5% 28% 11 47% 26% 20%
Hawai 48% 14% 13 11% 44% 25%
Idaho 28% 27% 11 2% 62% 18%
Illinois 49% 17% 14 8% 47% 35%
Indiana 37% 20%
Iowa 43% 19% 1 35% 63% 1 9% 41% 31% 14% 5% 1 13% 25% 25%
Kansas 34% 27% 12 14% 21% 51%
Kentucky 45% 14%
Louisiana 46% 12% 15 16% 27% 49%
Maine 39% 30% 6 41% 54% 7 51% 3% 44% 7 6% 38% 18%
Maryland 50% 14% 6 28% 67% 7 56% 7% 36% 16 11% 49% 29%
Massachu. 48% 23% 6 37% 60% 7 32% 3% 65% 11 5% 72% 12%
Michigan 44% 19% 5 43% 5% 51% 8 7% 41% 38%
Minesotta 43% 24% 7 63% 17% 20% 6 11% 17% 45%
Missisippi 41% 9% 13 31% 31% 33%
Missouri 44% 22% 6 34% 65% 7 58% 6% 35%
Montana 38% 26%
Nebraska 29% 24%
Nevada 37% 26% 5 21% 50% 10%
N. Hampshire 39% 23% 2 46% 50% 2 1% 30% 13% 6% 49% 2 9% 39% 9%
New Jersey 43% 16%
New Mexico 46% 16%
New York 50% 16% 6 33% 66% 7 51% 3% 43%
N. Carolina 43% 14%
N. Dakota 32% 23% 6 76% 5% 19% 11 8% 24% 40%
Ohio 40% 21% 6 25% 74% 7 58% 4% 37% 11 15% 38% 37%
Oklahoma 34% 23% 11 27% 28% 34%
Oregon 42% 24%
Pennsylvania 45% 18%
Rhode Island 47% 23% 6 40% 57% 7 36% 3% 60%
S. Carolina 40% 12% 4 53% 5% 42% 3 40% 28% 17%
S. Dakota 37% 22%
Tennessee 47% 10% 11 24% 28% 37%
Texas 37% 22%
Utah 25% 27%
Vermont 46% 23% 6 44% 54% 7 34% 3% 60% 11 8% 39% 24%
Virginia 41% 14% 6 53% 3% 44%
Washington 43% 24% 4 32% 68% 6 58% 2% 39% 10 10% 38% 24%
West Virginia 48% 16%
Wisconsin 41% 22% 16 6% 44% 37%
Wyoming 34% 26% 9 8% 39% 32%
Candidate Position 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
2000 Dem. Primary 2000 Rep. Primary 2012 Rep. Primary
Notes: Abreviations: round (rd), Brad (Bradley), Frbs (Forbes), Gngr (Gingrich), McC (McCain), Rmn (Romney), Sntrm 
(Santorum). Empty cells correspond to contests after a candidate's official withdrawal, or  following the end of a competitive 
primary, or otherwise not used in the analysis. Position: 0=insider/experienced, 1=outsider/grass roots/for change (for D), 
0=conservative, 1=moderate (for R). See text for details.  Sources: Federal Election Commission, George Washington 
University, CNN, New York Times, Dave Leip's Atlas of US Presidential Elections, USA Today, Wikipedia. 
Table A-2. Election Data: The 2004 and 2008 primaries.
State rd Clrk Dean Eds Geph Kerry Lieb rd Clint Eds Obm rd Giul Huck McC Rmn Thm
Alabama 6 42% 56% 7 41% 37% 18%
Alaska 6 25% 75% 7 22% 15% 44%
Arizona 3 26% 14% 7% 43% 7% 6 50% 43% 7 9% 47% 35%
Arkansas 6 70% 26% 7 61% 20% 14%
California 9 20% 65% 6 52% 43% 7 12% 42% 35%
Colorado 6 32% 67% 7 13% 18% 60%
Connecticut 9 24% 58% 6 47% 51% 7 7% 52% 33%
DC 8 24% 76% 9 16% 68%
Delaware 3 10% 10% 11% 50% 11% 6 43% 53% 7 15% 45% 33%
Florida 5 50% 14% 33% 5 15% 14% 36% 31%
Georgia 9 41% 47% 6 31% 67% 7 34% 32% 30%
Hawai 8 14% 50% 9 24% 76%
Idaho 8 22% 54% 6 17% 79%
Illinois 6 33% 65% 7 17% 47% 29%
Indiana 14 51% 49%
Iowa 1 0% 18% 32% 11% 38% 0% 1 29% 30% 38% 1 4% 35% 13% 25% 13%
Kansas 6 26% 74% 8 60% 24%
Kentucky 16 65% 30%
Louisiana 7 36% 57% 8 43% 42%
Maine 4 4% 28% 8% 45% 7 40% 59% 6 6% 22% 52%
Maryland 9 26% 60% 8 36% 61% 9 29% 55%
Massachu. 9 18% 72% 6 56% 41% 7 4% 41% 51%
Michigan 4 7% 17% 13% 52% 3 3% 16% 30% 39% 4%
Minesotta 9 27% 51% 6 32% 66% 7 20% 22% 41%
Missisippi 12 37% 61%
Missouri 3 4% 9% 25% 51% 4% 6 48% 49% 7 32% 33% 29%
Montana 17 41% 57% 7 15% 22% 38%
Nebraska 7 32% 68%
Nevada 6 17% 10% 63% 3 51% 4% 45% 4 4% 8% 13% 51% 8%
N. Hampshire 2 12% 26% 12% 38% 9% 2 39% 17% 37% 2 8% 11% 37% 32% 1%
New Jersey 6 54% 44% 7 8% 55% 28%
New Mexico 3 21% 16% 11% 42% 3% 6 49% 48%
New York 9 20% 61% 6 57% 40% 7 11% 52% 28%
N. Carolina 14 42% 56%
N. Dakota 3 24% 12% 10% 50% 1% 6 37% 61% 7 20% 23% 36%
Ohio 9 34% 52% 10 53% 45% 11 31% 60%
Oklahoma 3 30% 4% 30% 27% 7% 6 55% 31% 7 33% 37% 25%
Oregon 16 41% 59%
Pennsylvania 13 55% 45%
Rhode Island 9 19% 71% 10 58% 40% 11 22% 65%
S. Carolina 3 7% 5% 45% 30% 2% 4 27% 18% 55% 4 2% 30% 33% 15% 16%
S. Dakota 17 55% 45%
Tennessee 5 23% 4% 27% 41% 6 54% 41% 7 34% 32% 24%
Texas 10 51% 48% 11 38% 51%
Utah 8 30% 55% 6 39% 57% 7 2% 5% 90%
Vermont 9 6% 32% 10 39% 59% 11 14% 72%
Virginia 5 9% 7% 27% 52% 8 35% 64% 9 41% 50%
Washington 4 3% 30% 7% 49% 7 31% 68% 10 24% 50%
West Virginia 15 67% 26%
Wisconsin 7 18% 34% 40% 9 41% 58% 10 37% 55%
Wyoming 11 38% 61%
Candidate Position 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
2004 Democratic Primary 2008 Republican Primary2008 Dem. Primary
Notes: Abreviations: round (rd), Clark (Clrk), Edwards (Eds), Gephardt (Gep), Lieberman (Lieb), Clinton (Cli), Obama (Obm), 
Giuliani (Giul), Huckabee (Huck), McCain (McC), Romney (Rmn), Thompson (Thm). Empty cells correspond to contests after 
a candidate's official withdrawa, or  following the end of a competitive primary, or otherwise not used in the analysis. Position: 
0=insider, 1=outsider/grass roots/for change (for D), 0=conservative, 1=moderate (for R). See text for details. Sources: 
Federal Election Commission, ABC, CBS, CNN, MSNBC, PBS, USA Today.
not applicable: see text
not applicable: see text
not applicable
